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States are exercising an increasing array of spatial strategies of migration control, including in the area of asylum migration. Drawing on interview data with thirty-five British and American irregular migrant and asylum support groups (MASGs), this article explores the spatial “tactics” (De Certeau, 1984) employed by MASGs in response to strategies of migration control. We consider their infiltration of highly securitized physical spaces like detention centers and courts. We analyze their appropriation of control technologies and discuss their exploitation of inconsistencies within the neoliberalization of controls. These tactics highlight the importance of resistive actions that are carried out “within enemy territory” (De Certeau, 1984, 37). As such they represent a complementary set of actions to more radical forms of protest and consequently enrich our understanding of the diversity of forms of resistance.

Keywords: Migration; Asylum; Resistance; Activism


This article examines what can be done, and what is being done, in response to the increasingly harsh and exclusionary asylum systems that countries such as the US and UK maintain. The asylum systems of most developed countries have been transformed since the 1980s through parallel processes of devolution, inter-national cooperation, and privatization of migration controls. Developed states have deployed various geographical measures as part of these broad trends and innovations. The differential slowing down and speeding up of procedures and apparatuses of control to suit governmental logics illustrates a power-laden use of pacing and timing of border control processes (Bailey et al. 2002; Conlon 2011; Hyndman and Giles 2011). The exteriorization and devolution of migrant controls away from national territories through processes of off-shore, extra-territorial interception and the use of remote, largely invisible detention and processing facilities constitutes a set of powerful and exclusionary spatial measures (Coleman, 2012; Darling, 2009; Mountz, 2010).

It would be understandable to see these developments as a coherent and immutable thicket of strategies against which resistance is all but impossible. Drawing upon De Certeau’s (1984) concept of “tactics” however, this paper discusses some of the struggles irregular migrant and asylum support groups (MASGs) carry out against this dominant constellation of strategies from a marginal and dominated position. The paper therefore presents a rare view of counter-hegemonic efforts to undermine exclusionary border control practices by operating within or close to, but against, systems of subjugation and exclusion. While there is a significant body of work that examines radical activist actions against border controls that seek their wholesale replacement with a new system of rights and obligations, such as ‘No Borders’ groups that advocate the outright abolition of border controls (see for example, Nicholls, 2011; Rigby and Schlembach, 2013; Oliveri, 2012; Loyd et al, 2012), less work has addressed the place of ‘non-reformist reforms’ (Apple, 1995, 120) within immigration control that seek non-trivial improvements and alterations to existing practices and procedures.

MASGs are a compelling object of analysis because they are currently under considerably more pressure than before the financial crisis of the late 2000s. Reductions in funds available from both public and private sources have precipitated closures or down-sizing of MASGs and heightened competition among them for remaining funds in both the US and UK (Gill et al. 2012). More financial resources have simultaneously been funneled towards border enforcement activities by states. The increasing regulation and criminalization of support for irregular migrants, with more frequent prosecution of those housing, transporting or employing over-stayers for example, as well as stricter regulation of legal advice, have added to the challenges that MASGs encounter (Fekete, 2009). Their dwindling room for manoeuver is a worrying barometer of the health of counter-hegemonic practices in the age of global neo-liberalism.

The paper draws upon primary research with thirty-five MASGs in the UK and US conducted in 2010 and 2011. MASGs are heterogeneous, varying by size, motivation and scale of operation. Given the paucity of research on this sector, our sample was purposefully inclusive.  Half of the groups sampled employed less than ten people, one third were faith motivated, one fifth politically motivated and the remainder motivated by a concern for human rights. Few had connections to other MASGs in different countries. Another important fault-line among MASGs is the degree to which they are financed by public funds and/or are prepared to work with public or private organizations involved in securing borders. We focus upon groups that have developed close—yet critical—relationships with either state organizations or private immigration enforcement operations. Our interest is in the motivations and ramifications of this geographical “proximity” to established nodes and networks of subjugating institutional power.

First, we briefly review why De Certeau (1984) differentiates “strategies” from “tactics”. We then draw upon the analysis of our data, which involved systematic coding of interview transcripts, to present three on-the-ground tactics used by many of our respondents. While we make no claims that these tactics - which relate to the body, technological innovations, and exploiting the contradictions within the neoliberalization of migrant controls - are exhaustive of the tactical approaches employed by MASGs, they are significant because they were repeatedly discussed by respondents as effective in interrupting the effects of exclusionary constellations of border control.​[1]​

Strategies and tactics in migration control

The asylum and migration enforcement systems in the UK and US enact forms of spatial violence. They lay claim to a place, the “United” “Kingdom”/“States”, whose borders operate by identifying individuals who are conceived as “out of place” (Cresswell, 1996). For individuals subjected to the consequent controls, the result is often “disorder and hardship” (Coleman, 2009, 912). De Certeau describes how subjugating social forces maintain influence through “strategies”.  A strategy assumes that a space can be circumscribed as proper, thus implicitly defining an “improper” space, in which hegemonic groups can isolate the subject of their will and power (De Certeau, 1984, xix). 

Yet, for De Certeau, certain tactics remain available despite the strategies of dominating groups. These tactics are “the procedures of everyday creativity” (De Certeau, 1984, xiv) and are at least as important as the strategies of the powerful. They are the “clever tricks” and “knowing how to get away with things” (ibid, xix) that present themselves in the course of even the most subjugated of everyday lives. While they are marginal, De Certeau urges us not to underestimate them.

A question arises as to what forms of power tactics are effective against. Foucault’s distinction between sovereign and disciplinary power proves useful here. Tactics that rework particular configurations within existing systems of control risk strengthening sovereign power by implicitly shoring up the legitimacy of the sovereign. This is their principle flaw; they contest the way that strategies are effected rather than contesting the very right to effect a strategy. This can result in petitioning the sovereign power, which performs its authority.

If tactics risk strengthening sovereign power, however, De Certeau is clear that they address disciplinary power more effectively. In reference to Foucault he writes that,

If it is true that the grid of “discipline” is everywhere becoming clearer and more extensive it is all the more urgent to discover how an entire society resists being reduced to it, what popular procedures (…) manipulate the mechanisms of discipline and conform to them only in order to evade them? (Ibid. xiv).

From this we suggest that De Certeau’s tactics align with Foucault’s conception of power as a productive and relational force rather than one that is only understood as top-down and always oppressive​[2]​.

For De Certeau then, the strength of tactics is that they are able to “manipulate the mechanisms” (Ibid. xiv) or, as Cindi Katz has put it, rework power relations “on the very grounds on which they are cast” (Katz 2004, 247). Hence tactics operate within disciplining systems, turning formations of disciplinary power against themselves. “Although they are composed within the vocabularies of established languages”, they “trace out the ruses of other interests and desires that are neither determined nor captured by the systems in which they develop” (Ibid. xviii).

On the one hand then, tactics seem ill-fated in the face of the dominance they react against. They are only ever “manipulations of imposed spaces, tactics relative to particular situations” (Ibid. p24). On the other hand, tactics can be strikingly effective. They involve “victories of the ‘weak’ over the ‘strong’” (Ibid. xix) on the “home ground” of the established order (Ibid. 26). In the next section we draw upon MASGs’ experiences to outline three types of on-the-ground tactics.

The body as a site of tactics

The emergence of asylum as an abjectifying technology of governance constitutes populations without formal rights and protections. However, it would be a mistake “to assume that all we are left with is a wasteland of abject subjectivities, discarded and jettisoned from political life” (Nyers, 2004, 207). On the contrary “with each act of desubjectification comes another attempt of resubjectification by both the state and political subjects themselves” (Nyers 2004, 207, Tyler 2013).  The body is a key site through which counter-hegemonic tactics can be enacted, often deep within subjugating spaces. Detainee hunger strikes and lip sewing are material and symbolic acts of defiance that can jolt public sensibilities in powerful ways (Perera, 2002). They articulate an uncontainable excess at the level of the body that subjugating strategies cannot control (Wolfram & Minahan, 2004; Tyler, 2013; McGregor, 2011; Conlon, 2013).

Similarly, some of the tactics used by MASGs combine the times and spaces of immigration enforcement with bodily actions. Our interviewees were involved in supporting asylum seekers and irregular migrants through various corporeal activities. For example, one US faith-based MASG, deeply disturbed by the buses used to deport undocumented and irregular migrants from a county jail, decided to focus on gaining access to the buses to offer pastoral care and spiritual support to migrants whose deportations were imminent. Though predominantly Christian, the group operates as an inter-faith coalition providing spiritual support to detained migrants of all religions. One group member described some of the struggles the group faced. They combined “getting on the buses”, “laying down in front of the buses”, “a lot of publicity,” and “peaceful and consistent” requests to the jail’s management and to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials regionally and nationally. They persisted for five years and eventually gained access to the jail and the buses enabling members of the group to pray with and offer comfort to the detainees and deportees. Reflecting on their tactics, one group member remarked that “We couldn’t take no for an answer...I think with us they [prison authorities] kept saying ‘well if we just ignore ’em they’ll finally give up’ and [then] they found out we wouldn’t!” 

What was important for this activist group was physical, bodily presence in the same place, on the buses, with the detainees and deportees. Presence is used to communicate solidarity and compassion; as a way to monitor the treatment of detainees; and to enable spiritual and emotional connections with them. Such bodily tactics resonate with what Askins (forthcoming) describes as the “quiet politics” of “meaningful encounters” (np) that have become increasingly significant as the “proper space” of refuge for irregular migrants shrinks.

The same group describes the importance of their physical presence at court hearings determining the fate of the migrants they support. In response to the unpredictable behavior of local immigration judges, the group had initiated a program of court observations. This involved organizing supportive members of the public to sit in court galleries when detention and deportation cases were being heard so that the judges and clerks “know you’re there, that you care about those people and that you’re seeing what’s going on”. While some of our respondents claimed that “judges don’t embarrass”, others were convinced that such tactics make a difference. They have seen improvements in the relationship between judges, lawyers, and applicants, a less hostile court atmosphere, and fewer instances of intimidating behavior on the part of judges. These court observations are now a large-scale form of activism, drawing in student volunteers from nearby universities. This activity is termed “court-watching”, a nomenclature that is significant because the work of watching the state is an important form of "sousveillance" (inverse surveillance) that reflects the disciplining thrust of panoptic power back upon state actors. 





There are echoes of what has been termed “political jiu jitsu” (Sharp, 1973) in these migrant activist tactics: the use of an adversary’s energy against them in order to unbalance them. As De Certeau writes, 

“A tactic ... must play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by the law of a foreign power. It does not have the means to keep to itself, at a distance, in a position of withdrawal, foresight, and self-collection; it is a manoeuver ‘within the enemy’s field of vision’” (De Certeau, 1984, 36-7).

States use technological innovations in the governance of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. Dean (1999, 212) defines technologies as “forms of notation [and] ways of collecting, transporting and storing information”. Technologies are central to the strategy of marking out territory, and the intensification of the use of digital and other surveillance technologies at the border has been well documented (Amoore & Hall, 2009; Martin, 2010). As part of this inscription, accumulation and standardization there has been a “veritable ‘avalanche’ of printed numbers” (Rose 1999, 211), from censuses to registers, that allows those who govern to assume centrality at the hub of an informational infrastructure.

Technological records, however, do not only facilitate state activities, but also hold them in check by providing an opportunity to increase accountability. One of our interviewees, Jasmin​[3]​, was supporting a trauma survivor, Lucy. Upon being refused asylum in the UK and given a date for her deportation, Lucy had made multiple suicide attempts and was not fit to travel. Despite repeatedly trying to present the Home Office with new information about her case in writing, she had been instructed to attend a meeting in London in person, several hours’ journey away. Jasmin recalled that,

“This was someone who couldn’t get out of bed, who was in the foetal position 24 hours a day in her bedroom ... Totally disengaged, just believing that [this was] the end of her life”. 

After navigating a difficult journey and long queues, Lucy and Jasmin attended the meeting. Jasmin described how on arrival they received a numbered ticket, indicating their queue position, their location, and the date. After reaching the end of the queue they arrived at the desk only to be told that the application should have been made in writing. Jasmin explained: 

“I can’t swear but what I’m convinced happened is that she [the official] looked on the computer and saw that [Lucy] was going to be picked up next morning because it was next morning that they tried to pick her up [to be deported]. If she had managed to make her application they couldn’t do that. So [the official] deliberately lied to us and refused to take the application.”

To compound the situation, the Home Office official refused to give their name to Lucy and Jasmin, thus denying them information that could have helped them in an objection to this situation. Furthermore, upon returning from the restroom Jasmin discovered that, in her absence, Lucy had been asked to return the numbered ticket they had earlier received. Lucy, however, had realized that the ticket was the only proof that they had been present in London on that date and had put it in Jasmin’s briefcase earlier. The ticket became a key piece of evidence in their official complaint, which led to a judicial review, the reopening of the case and, eventually, to Lucy receiving refugee status.

While Lucy was deeply subjugated throughout this ordeal, her experience shows that the mundane technologies of the state, often used to cement the link between government and information through the “numericization of the population” (Rose, 1999, 210), can sometimes be subverted and set against their own original purposes. In other words, the paper trail that the state generates to numerically document, order, and govern can be usurped and put to use holding bureaucratic procedures to account. Thus, even deep within subjugating systems there are opportunities for “putting one over” on the established order (De Certeau, 1984, 25). As De Certeau observes, “The actual order of things is precisely what ‘popular’ tactics turn to their own ends, without any illusion that it will change any time soon... Into the institutions to be served are thus insinuated styles of social exchange, technical invention, and moral resistance” (Ibid. 26).

MASGs’ responses to video-linking in courts is another tactic that turns subjugating technologies to alternative ends. Governments in both the US and UK increasingly provide a two-way on-screen facility that allows applicants to be seen in the court and vice-versa, but from a distance.  Video links are intended to facilitate efficiency; more cases can be heard, as judges do not have to travel to detention centers. They can reduce time spent in detention, help clear court backlogs (which can be very lengthy in the US, see Transactional Records Access Clearing House, 2013), and, ultimately, speed up the time between arrival and possible deportation.

Almost all of our respondents were dismayed at how video-linking undermines detainees’ cases, which echoes concerns voiced previously by pressure groups (Bail for Immigration Detainees and the Refugee Council, 2008; Campaign to Close Campsfield, 2011). In addition to describing various technical drawbacks associated with video-linking, interviewees detailed how difficult it is for lawyers to communicate with video-linked clients if there is a need for private discussion while the case is being heard. Alternatively, sometimes a lawyer will be with a client during the video-linking, but this means the lawyer is not present in the courtroom, which has its own disadvantages. In this manner, detained migrants and legal representatives are relegated to the inauspicious space of the detention facility while immigration judges and state officials govern from a distance. 

Nevertheless, notwithstanding these disadvantages, one respondent’s organization explicitly exploited the technology to strengthen migrants’ cases. Health professionals are regularly asked to give expert testimony in courts, but accessing detainees and attending immigration hearings, frequently in remote locations, often means giving up a day’s work. Offering doctors and psychologists the opportunity to use video-linking strengthened the ability of our respondent to recruit expert testimonies in support of migrants’ accounts. As one of the organization’s coordinators put it:

“Our ... position is that [videolinking] might be a good thing... The in-court testimony can be difficult because [health professionals] may end up using their whole day because, of course, you have a certain time that it’s supposed to happen but you can end up waiting around in court. And a lot of the doctors really don’t like it. Particularly if it means they’re giving up a vacation day or giving up time when that could be seeing paying patients”.


To the extent that video-linking technology has been paid for by the state and put in place to expedite legal procedures that typically lead to deportation, this usurping of its intended purpose represents the possibility of “divert[ing] resources ... [i]n the very place where the machine ... reigns supreme” (De Certeau, 1984, 25).

Exploiting the Contradictions within Neoliberal Migrant Controls

Both the formal privatization of border controls and the more insipid roll-out of logics of territorial exclusion away from the state towards actors as diverse as teachers, lawyers, doctors, and the “citizen-detective” (Vaughan-Williams, 2008) have been well-documented. In the US this has been associated with a large-scale “delegation program” (Coleman, 2009, 907) that results in heightened responsibilities of an increasing number of local actors for a proliferating range of migration enforcement issues. For Coleman, many immigration policies in the US aim to render undocumented migrants “more legible” (911) to immigration authorities and consequently enroll various organizations in practices of detection and control, including driver’s license issuers, tax authorities, real estate agents, hospitals, and schools.

In the UK, too, devolution of enforcement has picked up pace with plans to require landlords to monitor the immigration status of tenants (Travis, 2013). In addition, the contracting of private security companies such as Serco, Mitie, and G4S has not only underpinned the expansion of the immigration detention system from a capacity of 250 in 1993 to more than ten times that number by 2005, but has also seen the development of payment-by-results contracts to detect and deport over-stayers (BBC, 2012) and the involvement of these same security firms in the provision of regular, supposedly non-carceral, housing for asylum seekers (Grayson, 2012).

The neoliberalization of immigration enforcement in both countries, including the privatization, delegation and devolution of controls, allows the state to deflect criticism of migrant control policies onto privately contracted companies and local deputies. It can also provide a mechanism of co-optation of third sector organizations that purport to support migrants, who work with security companies in the delivery of “services” to migrant groups. The involvement of Barnado’s, the prominent UK children’s charity, in a new secure center for migrant families awaiting deportation in the UK highlights this risk.

Yet even in this bleak neoliberal landscape there are opportunities to tactically resist. Our respondents identified a number of ways that they were able to exploit the internal contradictory logics within the neoliberal project of border control and enforcement. The high cost of detaining irregular migrants in the US and UK is a case in point. No matter whether detention exists as a reaction to migrant inflows (McBride 1999), as a deterrence strategy (Martin 2012), or as part of migrants’ initiation into neoliberal society (Conlon and Gill 2013), its presence announces a performative and expanding state. Today, with states under pressure to reduce spending, MASGs can use economic costs and the neoliberal mantra of austerity to their advantage. Where arguments against detention that draw on human rights discourse have limited impact, calls for reduced state expenditure have much more traction. UK-based research with 188 long-term detainees conducted in 2007-8 demonstrated that only eighteen percent were eventually deported (Detention Action, 2009). Given that detention cost £68 000 ($110 000) per detainee for one year in 2005/6, each individual deportation costs the UK taxpayer almost £700 000 ($1.13m) (Ibid.)​[4]​  In the US, the federal budget for ICE, which controls migrant detention, increased from $3.1 billion to 5.9 billion (an 87 percent increase) between 2005 and 2012 (Meissner, Kerwin, Chisti, and Bergeron, 2013).​[5]​ With such large outlays, heightened concern about government debt and expenditure “makes ... it easier to say, look you shouldn’t be detaining this many people, we don’t have the funds as a nation. This isn’t a good use of our money or our taxpayer dollars” (US-based respondent). Utilizing a neoliberal lexicon in this way bolsters arguments against detention. Our respondent continued:

“We’ve said all along that we think this nation over-detains immigrants. Now we can say we over-detain immigrants and it’s really expensive and we can’t afford it”.

By way of illustration recent sequester cuts have prompted the release of several hundred immigrants from detention centers across the US (Semple, 2013), demonstrating the value of these counter-hegemonic tactics.

Other tactical advantages arise as the overextension of the delegation of border controls causes a communication break-down between the central state and locally contracted or subcontracted agents. Our interviewees revealed ways in which they were able to play organizations and departments that operated at different scales off each other, exploiting weaknesses in communication between scales of government and private security firms, and working together to share information faster than migration control organizations in order to strengthen advocacy. One advocate commented of the state, “One wonders if there is a strategic plan in place. It seems rather chaotic the way that the system is managed, right? I think it’s because [the government] is so large”.

If the government seems chaotic, however, this disarray contrasts with increasingly coordinated horizontal inter-dependence between MASGs. While financial austerity has put pressure on many organizations, it has also prompted them to find ways to work together in an attempt to overcome the damaging competition for funds that austerity promotes. As one UK-based organization put it, “Oddly enough now there is no money, we’re finding less to argue about”. Our research revealed that a high proportion of our participants are linked to other groups as part of larger umbrella organizations that fund programs and activities, as well as providing other resources. Others form working group coalitions that are issue-specific including developing a coordinated response to recent funding cuts in the UK, responding to government policies such as detention, coordinating around benefits issues, and preparing funding bids.

One of the advantages of this horizontal inter-dependence is that it allows the chaotic inconsistencies between layers of state administration to be quickly identified, communicated, and exploited. One organization involved in national level advocacy work in the US reflected on how helpful it is to have local organizations feed issues to them:

“it’s hard for our organization to see what it looks like on the ground. But we also have much more of an inside voice and recognition within the federal government, and so we’re able to advocate. Then the local organizations ... have such great information and experience because they’re working so much more closely with the clients themselves and with the impacted population. [So, we] recognize where I sit versus where the people on the ground sit and recognizing the strengths and the barriers to both of those positions”





Either by necessity or because of their political motivations, most MASGs in the US and UK seek to improve conditions for asylum seekers and irregular migrants by dealing with the state on its own terms through what we can conceive of in geographical terms as tactical closeness and proximity to institutionalized centers of power. This means that MASGs often do not explicitly challenge the political ideologies and systems of border controls that have led to the abjection of asylum-seekers and migrants, even whilst they contest specific governmental policies and practices. As such they “alter the organization but not the polarization of power relations” (Sparke 2008, 2).
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^1	  Among several other tactics detailed were the development of collaborations and networks across the sector to counteract the effects of funding cuts and fragmentation. For a detailed account of responses by MASGs see Gill et al. (2012).
^2	  It is beyond the scope of the paper however to give a full analysis of the relationship between De Certeau’s and Foucault’s conceptions of power.
^3	  All such names are pseudonyms
^4	  Based on 2005/6 costs. Exchange rate: £1.00 = $1.617 (Jan. 2007).
^5	  Equivalent to an increase from £2billion to £3.8 billion.  Exchange rate £1.00=$1.517 (May 2013)
